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A simulation-based approach to measuring the fault-
resilience of real-time systems is presented. Simu-
lation is used to favor generality, comparability and
make it possible to study the system taking into con-
sideration its overall behavior instead of dealing only
with worst-case scenarios. Tasks can be analyzed in-
dividually, which may be useful when they have dif-
ferent levels of criticality. The simulation procedure
is efficient since only randomly generated parts of the
schedule are simulated. We show that results col-
lected from simulation can then be statistically ana-
lyzed for different scheduling models so that one can
infer the overall fault resilience for the system.
1 Introduction
Over the past decades computer designers focused
their attention on developing what they considered a
perfect computer project: computers had to be small,
fast and cheap [12]. Indeed, their effort in reach-
ing more performance at low cost and minimum size
contributed remarkably for recent technological ad-
vances, specially those related to hardware improve-
ments.
The remarkable growth of electronic devices and
computing systems in our daily activities has been
boosting mechatronics, as a subarea of automation
due to its ability of integrating electronic components
and systems [7, 4]. The main elements of a mecha-
tronic system can be observed in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Components of a mechatronic system [10].
The user is the entity responsible for monitoring,
supervisioning and controlling the controlled object,
which may be an airplane board control or an indus-
trial plant, for example. Controlled objects are usu-
ally manipulated through human-machine interface
(HMI), which is the element responsible for (i) trans-
lating control information to the user and (ii) allow-
ing an interface between users and controlled objects.
The control system is an interactive computer system
that enables monitoring and changing the state of a
controlled object, which is done through sensors and
actuators[8].
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The evolution of computer systems also allowed
systems designers to focus on modeling, designing
and implementation aspects of such systems aiming
at developing applications with differentiated perfor-
mance skills. At the same time, miniaturization of
electronic components allowed computers to evolve
from simply terminals to host control systems. For
some of these applications correctness were not only
associated with logical, but also with timing require-
ments. Indeed, systems in which correctness is as-
sociated not only with producing logically correct re-
sults, but also with the time at which such results are
produced (timeliness) are known as real-time systems
[5, 2].
Real-time systems are present in many different
areas such as medicine, avionics, multimedia and
mechatronics[13]. For some of them, when timing
requirements are not accomplished, the system may
not not achieve the expected level of Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS). This is what happens, for example, in
a video transmission (multimedia application). In
worst cases, missing timing requirements may have
undesired consequences as for example, if we con-
sider an automobile ABS control, in which human
life may be at risk [3]. This evidenced that differ-
ent applications may have different criticality levels.
Indeed, for “soft” real-time systems missing dead-
lines may not have more serious consequences, while
for “hard” real-time systems missing deadlines may
cause injuries for human beings and/or environment
[2, 9, 11].
Since temporal requirements play an important
role for real-time systems, it is crucial to have means
of guaranteeing such requirements. In fact, both
scheduling policies and schedulability analysis are re-
sponsible for ensuring timeliness for such applica-
tions. To do so, system tasks are ordered according to
a specific scheduling policy and a subsequent schedu-
lability analysis is performed to assess timeliness of
each task. We detail such aspects in Section 2.
Ensuring reliability is an important goal to be
achieved for real-time systems. However, in terms
of computational applications, the only certainty we
have is that all of them may potentially fail [1]. In
fact, system correctness relies on its dependability,
a concept which discussed in Section 3. Also, since
faults cannot be avoided and are difficult to predict
[9, 11], taking such events into consideration is almost
an obligation, if someone needs to guarantee QoS for
real-time applications or even avoid more serious con-
sequences.
In this paper we investigate the impact of errors in
real-time applications considering a specific schedul-
ing policy. To do so, we defined a simulation en-
vironment, presented in Section 4 and developed a
simulation tool, detailed in Section 5, which aims at
measuring fault resilience for a particular set of real-
time systems. Last, in Section 6, some conclusions
and and future works are drawn.
2 Real-Time System Overview
A real-time system is a computer system in which
both timing and logical requirements must be re-
spected. Thus, the correct behavior of such a system
depends not only on the integrity of produced logical
results (also known as “correctness”), but also on the
time at which they are produced (“timeliness”) [2].
Examples of real-time systems include current con-
trol laboratory experiments, vehicle control, nuclear
plants and flight control systems [13].
Usually, real-time systems are structured as a set
of n periodic tasks Γ = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τn}. A given task
τi represents a function, routine (or subroutine) or
any code snippet. Each task τi has attributes such
as an execution cost Ci, a deadline Di, an activation
period Ti and a recovery execution cost C¯i. Thus,
a periodic task can be described as an ordered tuple
τi = (Ci, Ti, Di, C¯i).
Tasks are executed in a specific order called ex-
ecution scale. Such a scale is defined based on
some heuristics, known as scheduling policy. Sev-
eral scheduling policies have been addressed in litera-
ture and most of them are priority oriented [3, 9, 10],
which means that tasks are ordered according to its
priority.
A well-known priority oriented scheduling policy is
Rate Monotonic (RM), according to which tasks with
shortest periods have higher priority. Clearly, this is
a fixed-priority policy, since tasks period are defined
oﬄine and do not change during system execution.
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After a scheduling policy is chosen for a given task
set Γ is it important to assess if any task τi in Γ
may miss its deadline. To do so, we perform some
tests, also known as schedulability analysis, which
aims at determining if a given task set is feasible. In
other words, such tests determine if any task τi ∈ Γ
misses its deadline. Clearly, schedulability analysis is
strongly linked with the chosen scheduling policy. In
this paper we address the analysis based on Processor
Utilization Analysis, which is discussed in Section 2.1.
2.1 Processor Utilization Analysis
According to this approach, the schedulability of a
given task set is assessed based on processor use. In-
deed, processor utilization U , for a given task set Γ
composed of n periodic and independent real-time







Regarding Rate Monotonic, if we assume a periodic
task set Γ in which tasks period are equal to their
deadlines, we state that Γ is schedulable if:
U ≤ n( n
√
2− 1) (2)
For RM, Processor Utilization Analysis is a suffi-
cient schedulability test, which means that it is not
able to ensure schedulability for all task sets. In fact,
it has been proven that [6] if
U ≤ ln 2 (3)
the task set is schedulable with RM. Otherwise,
the analysis does not guarantee schedulability. Also,
Rate Monotonic is considered an optimal algorithm
for systems in which tasks period are equal to their
deadlines (Ti = Di) [6].
3 Fault-Tolerant Real-Time
Systems
Faults are random events that cannot be predicted
or avoided. Actually, the only certainty we have is
that all computational applications potentially fail
[1]. Indeed, a fault may be caused by several differ-
ent events, as for example cosmic radiation, hardware
fatigue or malfunctioning, specification and/or imple-
mentation aspects.
A system is said to fail when there is a transition
from an expected correct behavior to an incorrect
and unexpected behavior. In other words, a fail rep-
resents a deviation from specification. The error is
the state that leads the system to fail and faults are
the causes of an error, which may be physical or al-
gorithmic [1]. Indeed, applications must provide con-
fidence in the expected operations, a concept usually
addressed as dependability, which is related to some
attributes such as availability, reliability, safety and
maintainability [14, 1].
In terms of real-time system there is a concern
about fault tolerance aspects, since a fault may af-
fect the system schedulability, or in other words, may
prevent tasks to meet their deadlines. For this rea-
son, faults are considered as a threat to dependabil-
ity. Thus, techniques must be implemented to deal
adequately with faults, so that applications keep their
correctness even in the presence of such events [14, 1].
Faults are more commonly classified based on the
persistence criterion, according to which they can
be transient, intermittent or permanent. Transient
faults occur only for a given time and then disap-
pear. An example could be electromagnetic interfer-
ence. When a transient fault occurs repeatedly it is
called intermittent, as for example a loose contact on
a connector. Both transient and intermittent faults
are difficult to diagnose. Last, permanent fault is
one that continues to exist until the faulty compo-
nent is repaired, as for example a lack of connectivity
between two nodes in a network [10, 14].
In this paper we investigate the effects of transient
faults focusing on on techniques that can be used
to deal with such faults, which are based on tempo-
ral redundancy. This consists of repeating the com-
putation in time, or in terms of scheduling can be
understood as re-executing a task (see Figure 3) or
executing an alternative task (see Figure 3) until the
system is put on a safe state [9, 11].
Figures 3 and 3 presents a periodic task set be-
ing shceduled, where Γ = {τ1 = (1, 2), τ2 = (1, 5).
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Figure 2: Recovery based on re-execution of Task 1
under RM
Observe that in Figure 3 an error occurred at t = 3
(red arrow), which affect Task 1. The faulty task
re-executed immediately since there were no other
higher priority task to execute. On the other hand,
in Figure 3, an error affected Task 2 at t = 6 (red
arrow), but it only could recover at time t = 7, since
Task 1 was already released for execution and has a
higher priority than Task 2.
Figure 3: Recovery based on the execution of an al-
ternative version of Task 2 under RM
In the following sections we present the devel-
oped tool which focus on measuring the resilience of




The assumed system model considers a task set Γ
composed of n independent and periodic real-time
tasks Γ = {τ1, . . . τn}. Each task τi is represented by
a tuple τi = (Ci, Ti) where Ci is the constant worst-
case execution time (wcet) of each task and Ti is the
activation period. Also, we assume that the deadline
for each task is the same as its period (Ti = Di).
Tasks are scheduled according to Rate Monotonic,
since this algorithm deals with fixed priority tasks
and is widely used for embedded critical applications.
Also, schedulability analysis is performed with Pro-
cessor Utilization Analysis.
4.2 Fault Model
Assuming a specif fault model is a difficult task since
faults are random and cannot be predicted. We con-
sider that the system is subject to multiple transient
faults which can occur at any time instant.
Also, we represent the fault resilience of a given
system through the maximum number of errors the
system can handle and keep its correct behavior. To
do so, we use a random function in MATLAB R© to
generate the number of errors that will affect each
system. Also, the time instant in which errors occurs
is also determined through a random procedure.
We discard errors that occur at time instants in
which no task is executing, since such errors will not
affect system behavior. We assume that fault detec-
tion occurs implicitly, at the end of each task execu-
tion, since the focus of the work is not the detection
procedure, but system behavior after recovery strate-
gies.
4.3 Recovery Model
The recovery model describes the strategy used to
put the system in a safe state. Indeed, we consider
two possible actions: (i) faulty task re-execution or
(ii) execution of an alternative task. Both strategies
are defined oﬄine, before running the system, and are
performed in idle time instants available in execution
scale.
5 Simulation Tool
The general overview of the developed tool can
be seen in Figure 4. The tool was developed in
MATLAB R©, due to its versatility on numerical anal-
ysis, encapsulated functions and graphics.
The first step to use this tool is to input a schedu-
lable task set. In case the user has no previously gen-
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Figure 4: Framework of Simulation Environment
erated task set, it is possible to generate a random
one inside developed environment. To to so, the user
only have to choose the number of tasks to be gen-
erated. In case the tool generate the task set, it also
tests if it is schedulable, through processor utilization
analysis.
After, the user has to generate the number of errors
that will affect the task set. As mentioned before,
such a number is randomly generated by the tool.
The user only defines a lower and upper bound, which
will represent the interval in which the number of
errors will be in.
Based on the number of errors, the tool generates
random time instants in which errors will occur. The
screen of MATLAB R© running the simulator can be
seen in Figure 5.
The simulation environment will generate an ex-
ecution scale, which takes into consideration Rate
Monotonic, as scheduling policy, the defined recov-
ery scheme (re-execution or alternative task code)
and the time instants in which errors occur. Based
on those values, the system resilience is defined and
results can be graphically checked.
Briefly, the simulator executes the following steps,
given the inputs described in Figure 4:
1. Identify tasks affected by errors;
Figure 5: Screen shot of MATLAB R© running simu-
lator
2. Identify idle time after each faulty task, which
can be used for recovery;
3. Verify the possibility of re-executing the faulty
task or executing an alternative code, respecting
tasks priority (including the simultaneous verifi-
cation of space for recovery and maximum exe-
cution time);
4. Graphically analyze the resilience of the system,
through graphically generated execution scale.
5. Inform the number of errors and time instant
which makes the system unschedulable.
To make things clear let us consider the following
example:
Example 5.1. Assume a task set Γ = {τ1, τ2} com-
posed of two independent and periodic tasks where
C = (3, 3) and D = T = (8, 12). Tasks are sched-
uled according to RM and in case of faults, tasks are
re-executed. In other words, Ci = C¯i.
Figure 6: Execution Scale for Example 5.1
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The system is simulated during the hyperperiod
h = lcm(8, 12) = 241 to ensure that all system exe-
cution will be considered.
Figure 7: Idle processor time for Example 5.1, graph-
ically represented in tool
The first chart presented in Figure 6 presents the
execution scale for the given task set. The random
number of faults that this task set is subject to is
nf = 2 and the random time instants in which they
occur was tf = (3, 18). This is shown by the “star”
mark in the chart. Detected errors are indicated by
circles.
Figure 7 evidences the idle processor time, which
are represented in gray. Finally, Figure 8 presents the
fault-tolerant real-time schedule.
Figure 8: Fault Tolerant Scheduling for Example 5.1
assuming errors at tf = (3, 18)
It is important to mention that depending on the
time instant that errors occur, the system may not
be schedulable, even if it is subject to the same num-
ber of errors. Observe Figure 9, which presents the
same task set described in Example 5.1 subject to
two errors that happens at tf = (2, 3).
Observe that in this case, recovery of both faulty
tasks is not possible, since the available idle time
1lcm(x, y) is the function which calculates the least common
multiple of input parameters, in this case, x and y. Usually
systems are simulated during the hyperperiod, since it contains
all system behavior.
Figure 9: Execution Scale for Example 5.1 assuming
errors at tf = (2, 3)
(same as presented in Figure 7) is not enough for re-
covering tasks τ1 and τ2 before their respective dead-
lines. The graphic presented by simulator is accord-
ing to Figure 10, confirming that the fault-tolerant
scheduling is not feasible.
Figure 10: Fault Tolerant Scheduling for Example 5.1
assuming errors at tf = (2, 3)
6 Conclusions and Future
Work
Real-time systems have been used in a wide range
area, as for example to control industrial processes.
For most of these applications, missing timing re-
quirements imply in a loss of Quality of Service or in
worst cases may cause social, economic and/or envi-
ronmental injuries. In this context, it is extremely
necessary to deal with unpredictable and random
events, such as faults, so that they interfere mini-
mally in systems operation. In this paper we devel-
oped a simulation tool in MATLAB R© environment to
deal with fault-tolerant real-time scheduling, so that
errors consequences can be envisioned, before system
is put on operation. One of our goal is to have an ap-
proximation between theoretical and practical mod-
els. This will enable more detailed studies and previ-
ous use of simulations before the applications are put
into production. As future work we aim at simulating
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more robust systems, to evaluate better our prelimi-
nary results. Also, we focus on extending scheduling
policies, so that EDF [6] is also considered.
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